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LIABILITY OF SAVINGS BANKS FOR PAYMENTS MADE TO
VRONG PERSONS PRESENTING A DEPOSITOR'S PAss-BooK.-

In Kingsley v. Whitman Savings Bank, 65 N. E. 16i (1902),
a by-law of the bank provided that the bank would not be
responsible for loss where a depositor had not given notice
that his pass-book had been lost or stolen if the deposit shall
have been paid upon presentation of the book. The bank
paid money to one presenting the pass-book and forged orders
purporting to be signed by the depositor, and when sued by
the depositor, contended it was not liable to him under the
provisions of the by-law. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, after considering some of the leading decisions,
held, however, that the bank had no authority to make the
payments, that the by-law authorized a payment to one who
falsely personated the depositor in presenting the book, but
not to one who falsely claimed to act under the authority of
the depositor. The meaning and significance of the by-law
was the chief subject in the court's consideration of the case.

NOTES.

Most all savings banks have by-laws intended to protect
the institution where it pays out money to one presenting the
pass-book issued by the company. These rules are generally
rinted in the book and constitute the contract between the
bank and the depositor. The language of these rules is very
different in different banks, but the object of them is, nevertheless, the same in all cases. Although it would be impracticable to give here all the. by-laws so used, it seems proper to
quote two of the commonest forms: "Although the bank
will endeavor to prevent fraud and impositions, yet all payments to persons producing the pass-books issued by it shall
be valid payments to discharge the bank;" another form
often usedis: "As the officers of the bank may be unable to
identify every depositor, the bank will not be responsible for
loss sustained where a depositor has not given notice of his
book being lost or stolen, if such book be paid in whole or in
part on presentment."
By-laws of this kind, although protective in their nature,
do not allow the bank to act carelessly and recklessly; they
do not relieve the bank from the duty of acting" in good faith
and with reasonable care." Brownv. Savings Bank, 67 N. H.
549 (1893); Ladd v. Savings Bank, 96 Me. Sxo (igo2); Gearns
v. Savings Bank, 13V N. Y. 57 (1892); Lvy v. Bank, xz7
Mass. 448 (1875)% The question of due care and diligence is
one of law or fact depending upon whether the evidence is
conclusive or debatable, Allen v. Savings Bank, 69 N. Y. 314
(1877), although ordinarily the question should be submitted
to a jury. Brown v. Bank, 67 N. H. 549 (1893). Some banks,
by a provision in their by-laws, agree to use their "best efforts
to prevent fraud," and in such case the bank must exercise
more than ordinary care. Allen v. Savings Bank, 69 N. Y. 324
(x877). Numerous cases could be cited to illustrate what
constitutes reasonable care and diligence, but authorities are
of little help on a question of this kind, since each case has to
be decided upon its own particular facts. The following
things have been held to be evidence of negligence: (a) failure
to adopt proper means of identification, Ladd v. Bank, 96 Me.
xo (x9o2),Brown v. Bank, 67 N. H. 549 (3893); (b) failure to
institute inquiry, Gearns v. Bank, 135 N. Y. 557 (1892), Brown
v. Bank, 67 N. H. 549 (1893); and (c) failure to notice an
apparent dissimilarity between signatures, Appleby v. Bank,
62 N. Y. 12 (i875). It has been held, however, that the burden is on the plaintiff to show the negligence on the part of
the bank. Israel v. Bank, 9 Daly (N. Y.) 507 (1881).
The next question which naturally arises is, what is the
effect of the negligence of the depositor in the care of his book?
Sevtral well-considered cases support the view that this, of
itself, does not affect the liability of the bank. In People's
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Savings Bank v. Cupps, 91 Pa. 31S" (z879), the court considered it immaterial whether plaintiff was negligent in the care
of his book or not, and said, "It was a case of mispayment
In Ladd v. Savings Bank,
contrary to the published rules."
96 Me. Sxo (i9o), the court held that negligence of adepositor
in losing his book does not excuse the officers of the bank from
the exercise of reasonable care in taking precautions to prevent payment to an impostor, and that this is true notwithstanding the existence of a by-law in effect requiring imme.
diate notice to the bank by the depositor of the loss of his book.
InGeitelsohnv.Bank, 17 Misc. (N. Y.) 574 (z896), the Supreme
Court said: "The introduction of the rule as to contributory
negligence is a novelty in these cases."
Having noted these generalprinciples, let us see under what
circumstances the question of the bank's liability comes up.
Nearly all the cases may be divided into two classes:
x. Where, as in Kingslky v. Savings Bank, supra, the bank
pays to one presenting an order, purporting to be signed by
the depositor, and the depositor's pass-book, and
2. Where the bank pays to one personating the depositor
and presenting the depositor's pass-book.
In Massachusetts, as we have seen, the courts draw a sharp
line of distinction between these two classes of cases. In the
first *class of cases, Kingsley v. Savings Bank represents the
law and they hold the bank liable. In Levy v. Bank, 1x7
Mass. 448 (1875), a by-law was similar to that in the above
case except that it contained the following additional clause:
"In all cases, a payment upon presentation of a deposit book
shall be a discharge to the corporation for the amounts so
paid."
The court held that this clause enlarged the by-law
to such an extent as to "protect the bank if it, using reasonable care and in good faith, upon the presentation of the book
paid the plaintiff's deposit, although the book had been stolen
and an order purporting to be signed by the depositor forged."
In a Connecticut case, Eaves v. Bank; 27 Conn. 229 (1858),
where a bank paid to a person presenting the pass-book and
also a forged order, the court held the bank liable, saying, "A
forged power of attorney is no power of attorney at all, and
the presentation of the bank book alone is of no greater effect,
But in Schoenwald v. Bank,
for the book is not negotiable."
57 N. Y. 418 (z874), on a similar state of facts, the court held
that the bank was authorized to pay upon presentation of
the book without an order from the depositor, and the fact
that the order was forged was immaterial. This case, how-.
ever, has been "distinguished" and "limited" by Allen v.
Bank, 69 N. Y. 34 (1877), and by Smith v. Bank, zox N. Y.
58 (x885), and its value at the present day may well be questioned.
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In Pennsylvania there are but two cases in point. In Burrill v. DollarSavings Bank, 92 Pa. 134 (1879), one of the rules
of the bank was the following: "If any person shall present a
deposit book at the office of this corporation, and allege himself or herself untruly to be the depositor named therein, and
shall thereby obtain from the officers of this corporation the
amount deposited or any part thereof, and the actual depositor
shall not have given previous notice at the office of his or her
book having been lost or taken from him or her, this corporation will not be responsible for the loss so sustained by any
depositor, neither will this institution be liable to make good
the same. Provided that such payment has been entered in
the book of the depositor at the time when made.!' The book
of a depositor was temporarily extracted from his trunk, an
order was forged, and certain moneys were drawn from the
bank without his knowledge. He afterwards brought suit
for the amount and it was contended that the above rule
relieved the bank from liability. The court held that the rule
of the bank was reasonable and necessary for its safety, and
that plaintiff could not recover, and further held that the fact
that plaintiff was illiterate and could not read the rules in the
book delivered to him made no difference. In People's Savings Bank v. Cupps, 91 Pa. 3:5 (1879), where a bank paid out
money on forged orders and these orders were not witnessed,
as the by-laws required the orders of absent depositors to be,
the court held the bank liable.
In the second class of cases, where a bank pays to one presenting the pass-book and personating the depositor, there is
a disagreement among the authorities as to the liability of the
bank.. In Massachusetts, the courts deem the banks not
liable; if they have used reasonable care and diligence in
making the payments. Goldrick v. Bank, 123 Mass. 320
(1877); Kimins v. Bank, 141 Mass. 33 (1886). The Supreme
Court of Maine was of the same opinion in Sullivan v. ITstitution of Savings, 56 Me. 507 (1869).
In Smith v. Bank, xoi N. Y. 58 (1885), the Court of Appeals
of New York, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Reeger, said:
"Such a pass-book is not negotiable paper and its possession
constitutes, in itself, no evidence of a right to draw money
thereon. " The couft were of opinion that the by-laws contemplated but two modes of payment, one to depositor personally and the other upon his written order, both requiring
the presentation of the pass-book as a condition thereof; and
it did not authorize or protect the bank in a payment to -a
stranger whose only evidence of authority to receive it was
the possession of the pass-book. This case, however, is criticised in a later New York decision, Geitelsohn v. Bank, x 7
Misc. (N. Y.) 574 (z896), where the Supreme Court says:" But
this (referring to the above quotation from Smith v. Bank)
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excludes the effect of the rules taken in connection with the
possession of the book." As we have seen, possession of the
book, when there is no fact or circumstance to excite suspicion
or inquiry and when customary and ordinary means of identification are employed, justifies payment to the holder."
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island takes the same view as
the Massachusetts courts and as the Supreme Court of New
York took iii the last-mentioned case; and in Palmerv. Institution for Savings, 14 R. I. 68 (i885), Mr. Justice Matteson,
speaking for the appellate court, said: "The possession of
the book would afford a strong presumptibn that the person
presenting it was authorized to receive the money." In a
very recent New Jersey case, Cosgrove v. Institution for Savings, 64 N. J. L. 653 (i9oo), where a by-law provided that
"Deposits and dividends shall be drawn out only by the depositors in person, or by their written order, or by some person legally authorized and only upon production of the depositor's book, that such payments may be entered therein,
and all payments to persons who present the deposit book
shall be valid payments to discharge the bank and its officers,
the court twld, that a payment made by the bank in good faith
and in the exercise of due care to any person who produces
the pass-book, operates to discharge the bank without regard
to whether or not such person is entitled to draw the money.
The cases cited in this paper are the leading decisions upon
this subject, and it is readily seen that they do not all harmonize in their results. In summarizing, however, it may be
said that in nearly all the cases the courts have adopted practically the same considerations in rendering their decisions.
They recognize the bank's power to make by-laws to govern
their liability and agree that these by-laws, when agreed to
by the depositor either actually or constructively, constitute
the contract between the parties; they hold that, notwithstanding these by-laws, the banks must use reasonable care
and diligence, and if such is not used, the banks are liable for
mispayments. As the by-laws constitute the contract between the parties, the courts, in the decision of each case, try
to give due effect to the provisions of the particular by-laws,
and at the same time try to afford as much protection to the
depositor as is consistent with their interpretation of the contract. This is the general attitude taken by the courts in
deciding questions of this kind, and when we consider that
the by-laws in the various cases so often are differently
worded and have different significations, we can readily
understand that there is bound to be some diversity -inthe
decisions, since each case has been decided upon the language and meaning of the particular by-laws and upon its
own particular state of facts.

E. L. G.

